
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SMART CONTRACT CODE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT



Customer: StrongBlock Date: November 23rd, 2021



This document may contain confidential information about IT systems and the intellectual property of the Customer as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

The report containing confidential information can be used internally by the Customer, or it can be disclosed publicly after all vulnerabilities are fixed – upon a decision of the Customer.

Document

Name	Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for StrongBlock.		
Approved by	Andrew Matiukhin CTO Hacken OU		
Туре	Staking		
Platform	Ethereum / Solidity		
Methods	Architecture Review, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review		
Repository	https://github.com/StrongBlock/eth2.pool.contract		
Commit	ea3eb31067b2cf193e98bfdd310d89807df9eb21		
Technical Documentation	NO		
JS tests	NO		
Website	strongblock.com		
Timeline	09 NOVEMBER 2021 - 23 NOVEMBER 2021		
Changelog	12 NOVEMBER 2021 - INITIAL AUDIT 19 NOVEMBER 2021 - SECOND REVIEW 23 NOVEMBER 2021 - THIRD REVIEW		



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Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by StrongBlock (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of the Customer's smart contract and its code review conducted between November 9th, 2021 - November 12th, 2021.

Second review conducted on November 19th, 2021.

Third review conducted on November 23rd, 2021.

Scope

The scope of the project is smart contracts in the repository: Repository: https://github.com/StrongBlock/eth2.pool.contract Commit: ea3eb31067b2cf193e98bfdd310d89807df9eb21 Technical Documentation: No JS tests: No Contracts: Context.sol ETHPool.sol ETHPoolInterface.sol IERC20.sol Ownable.sol PlatformFees.sol PlatformFeesInterface.sol ReentrancyGuard.sol SafeMath.sol



We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that are considered:

Category	Check Item
Code review	 Reentrancy
	 Ownership Takeover
	 Timestamp Dependence
	 Gas Limit and Loops
	 DoS with (Unexpected) Throw
	 DoS with Block Gas Limit
	 Transaction-Ordering Dependence
	 Style guide violation
	 Costly Loop
	 ERC20 API violation
	 Unchecked external call
	 Unchecked math
	 Unsafe type inference
	 Implicit visibility level
	 Deployment Consistency
	 Repository Consistency
	 Data Consistency
Functional review	
	 Business Logics Review
	 Functionality Checks
	 Access Control & Authorization
	 Escrow manipulation
	 Token Supply manipulation
	 Assets integrity
	 User Balances manipulation
	 Data Consistency manipulation
	 Kill-Switch Mechanism
	 Operation Trails & Event Generation



Executive Summary

According to the assessment, the Customer's smart contracts are well-secured.

Insecure	Poor secured	Secured	Well-secured
		You are here	1

Our team performed an analysis of code functionality, manual audit, and automated checks with Mythril and Slither. All issues found during automated analysis were manually reviewed, and important vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. All found issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

As a result of the audit, security engineers found $\mathbf{1}$ high and $\mathbf{3}$ low severity issues.

After the second review security engineers found that all previously found issues were fixed but 1 high severity issue was added to the code.

After the third review security engineers found that **all** issues were addressed.



Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description		
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to assets loss or data manipulations.		
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have a significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g., public access to crucial functions		
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they can't lead to assets loss or data manipulations.		
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused, etc. code snippets that can't have a significant impact on execution		



Audit overview

🛛 🗖 🗖 Critical

No critical issues were found.

📕 📕 📕 High

1. ETH could be locked.

The transfer function may fail if a recepient is the contract address with fallback function. As a result, funds may be locked.

Contract: ETHPool.sol

Functions: processClaimPayment, processFee

Recommendation: stop using transfer() or send() and switch to using call() instead.

Status: Fixed

2. Incorrect ETH recipient.

processPayment function always sends ETH to the getFeeWallet() and never to the "recepient"

Contract: ETHPool.sol

Functions: processPayment

Recommendation: make sure you're sending ETH to the correct address.

Status: Fixed

🔳 🔳 Medium

No medium severity issues were found.

Low

1. Boolean equality.

Boolean constants can be used directly and do not need to be compared to **true** or **false**.

Contract: ETHPool.sol

Functions: unStake, claimReward

Recommendation: Remove the equality to the boolean constant.

Status: Fixed

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2. Repeated function call.

calculateReward function called twice with the same arguments which burns excess gas.

Contract: ETHPool.sol

Functions: claimReward

Recommendation: Please save the result of the first call to the local variable.

Status: Fixed

3. A public function that could be declared external.

public functions that are never called by the contract should be declared **external** to save gas.

Contracts: ETHPool.sol, Ownable.sol, PlatformFees.sol

Functions: ETHPool.stake, ETHPool.unStake, ETHPool.claimReward, ETHPool.changeEpochTime, ETHPool.addNewEpoch, ETHPool.upcomingWeightOf, ETHPool.getStakeInfo, ETHPool.getUserIds, ETHPool.getUserIdIndex, Ownable.renounceOwnership, Ownable.transferOwnership, PlatformFees.setStakeFeeNumenator, PlatformFees.setStakeFeeDenominator, PlatformFees.setUnstakeFeeNumenator, PlatformFees.setUnstakeFeeDenominator, PlatformFees.setClaimFeeNumenator, PlatformFees.setclaimFeeDenominator, PlatformFees.setMinStakeAmount,

PlatformFees.setStakeLimit, PlatformFees.setFeeWallet

Recommendation: Use the **external** attribute for functions never called from the contract.

Status: Fixed



Conclusion

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools.

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

As a result of the audit, security engineers found $\mathbf{1}$ high and $\mathbf{3}$ low severity issues.

After the second review security engineers found that all previously found issues were fixed but 1 high severity issue was added to the code.

After the third review security engineers found that **all** issues were addressed.



Disclaimers

Hacken Disclaimer

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only — we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on a blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.